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Zbigniew Brzezinski is a man of extremes. He asserts an idea and defends it. Whether in 
casual conversations or foreign negotiations, he does not compromise. It seems Brzezinski has 
done everything possible to earn his reputation. To his fans he is a hero, the man who “cracked 
the Kremlin.”1 To his opponents – some of whom have worked by his side – he is nothing more 
than a “rat terroir” who “never accepted a defeat as final.”2 The intensity of these reactions are 
not surprising. Through his sixty years of work, Brzezinski has never sugarcoated his opinion 
and many times his ideas have failed to conform to mainstream thought. His ideas and the way in 
which he asserts them are extreme. It would only seem his reputation would follow in a like 
manner. 
Many look to his childhood as the reason for his personality and anti-Soviet agenda. Born 
in 1928 in Warsaw, political hostility plagued Brzezinski’s early years. Tadeusz Brzezinski, his 
father, was a member of the Polish Foreign Ministry. In 1931, Tadeusz was transferred to Berlin 
and Brzezinski spent the first ten years of his lives watching the rise of the Third Reich.
3
 When 
Tadeusz was relocated to Soviet-controlled Ukraine in 1936 he did not take his wife and children 
with him. During his term in Ukraine Tadeusz discovered that many of his acquaintances were 
disappearing and never heard from again. The diplomat accepted a job at the consul in Canada in 
1938 out of fear for his and his family’s safety. Only months later the Nazi-Soviet Pact divided 
Poland. The Brzezinski family remained in Canada and watched Germany and the USSR tear 
their home country to pieces.
4
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Brzezinski adjusted to his new surroundings well. He attended McGill University in 1945 
for his Bachelors and Masters degrees, Harvard in 1950 for his doctorate, and began his teaching 
career at Columbia University in 1959. He founded the Research Institute on Communist Affairs 
at Columbia and became involved in a variety of think tanks and foreign policy teams. In 1977, 
he made his national debut by becoming National Security Adviser in the Carter administration. 
By this time, he had published over seven major works related to the Soviet Union. Scholars, 
adversaries, and newspapers are quick to draw a line between Brzezinski’s childhood and his 
academic and political views. The common claim is that the events of his childhood instilled his 
firm anti-Soviet persona. This answer oversimplifies the man and does him little justice. 
Surprisingly, there is little work on Brzezinski. Only recently scholars have begun 
reevaluating his academic and political contributions. The works he published from 1956 to 1976 
have not been consecutively analyzed in decades. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is time 
scholars reopen Brzezinski’s books and reexamine his ideas. The studies of Brzezinski’s term as 
National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981 are also lacking. Many fail to look beyond the 
hyperbolic opinions of his fans and opponents during the administration. It is time to approach 
Brzezinski’s term in the White House and seriously analyze how his actions effected American 
foreign policy during the Cold War and what consequences our nation is still dealing with. 
These periods of Brzezinski’s life are intellectually connected. Through the mid-
twentieth century, he used his theory of totalitarianism to build a tower of ideas that he has never 
stopped adding to. By his own admission, most of his adult life “was spent strategizing how to 
undermine the Soviet bloc.” In reference to his publications and term as National Security 
Adviser, Brzezinski claimed that he “had a whole theory of how to do it, a concept which goes 
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back to the 1960s.” 5 There is a clear progression of Brzezinski’s ideas demonstrated through his 
published works from 1956-1977 and his activities as National Security Adviser from 1977-
1981. He develops an interpretation of the Soviet system through his totalitarian model, 
constructs a foreign policy plan through his theory of peaceful engagement, and then tests these 
ideas during the Carter administration. 
Brzezinski’s consistent goal was to cause the collapse of the Soviet system and assert 
American dominance. He believed that the Soviet system, the totalitarian machine that sought 
ideological uniformity throughout the Communist world, was outdated. He predicted its evitable 
failure, claiming that political revisionism in the satellite states would slowly tear the Communist 
nations apart. Peaceful engagement sought to encourage revisionism through cultural, political, 
and intellectual exchange between the West and East. The American government would interject 
in Eastern European politics and border disputes, acting as the peaceful overseer of negotiations. 
By giving the satellite states incentive to look to America for leadership, Brzezinski sought to 
prepare the United States for an era when the USSR did not exist. 
He further developed these ideas during his term as National Security Adviser. His focus 
shifted to the Carter administration’s humanitarian policies during this time. Brzezinski 
integrated his Soviet-centric ideas with Carter’s human rights campaign, creating an invaluable 
political tool that would put Moscow on the ideological defensive. In particular, Brzezinski 
greatest success was recovering five political prisoners from the Soviet Union, simultaneously 
shaming the USSR for its human rights abuses and offering a message of hope and moral 
superiority to his fellow American citizens. Moreover, Brzezinski’s methods of negotiations 
developed during this time. In his meetings with the Special Coordination Committee, prisoner 
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negotiations with Soviets, and quiet conversations with Carter, Brzezinski gained a reputation as 
an assertive and uncompromising statesman. 
These two sections of Brzezinski’s life are also important because together they illustrate 
the intellect’s vision for the world. His pre-Carter publications analyze how the world operates 
and what future is in store for humanity. Brzezinski predicted a world that would become 
globalized under the banner of democratic ideas. In this vision, the United States leads humanity 
intellectually and politically while the USSR becoming increasingly irrelevant to international 
affairs. Brzezinski’s term as National Security Adviser demonstrates how he believed the United 
States needed to operate in order to reach this vision. Most importantly, he believed that the 
American government needed to assert its policies and refuse to terms that did not benefit them. 
Brzezinski’s refusal to compromise SALT II details or submit to Soviets terms of the 1979 
prisoner exchange testify to this conviction. Together, these periods of Brzezinski’s life illustrate 











Chapter 1: Brzezinski’s Theories of Totalitarianism and Peaceful Engagement, 1956 – 1976 
 
  “My view of America’s role in the world is still an optimistic one,” Zbigniew Brzezinski 
wrote in 1970. “I truly believe that this society has the capacity…to surmount the difficulties 
inherent in this current historic transition.”6 Imbedded in this statement lies the argument that 
only the United States had the capability to advance humanity towards a stable future of 
globalization. Its institutions of liberalism and democracy acted as the fire in which grand ideas 
were forged. This creative fever established a precedent of determination and exceptionalism in 
America that was unmatched by any other society. 
 Despite these almost sacred beliefs regarding the United States, most of Brzezinski’s 
work focused on the USSR and its political system. While America was destined to nourish 
humanity’s future, its antagonist the Soviet Union was inherently defective and a burden on the 
progression of humankind. The obsolete ideological foundation from which it shouted its “faded 
revolutionary slogans” would eventually crumble under the pressure of ideological revisionism.7 
For the United States to succeed as world leader, it first needed to accelerate the collapse of the 
USSR by encouraging this revisionism through foreign policies aimed at politically neutralizing 
satellite states of the Communist camp. 
 Within Brzezinski’s broad vision of humanity and the US-USSR rivalry, he constructed 
theories that analyzed how the Soviet system functioned, how it changed, and what role the 
United States needed to assert in response to the actions of the USSR. In particular, Brzezinski’s 
model of totalitarianism deconstructed the nature of the Soviet system and his theory of peaceful 
engagement offered policies to stimulate its disintegration. These theories relied on each other 
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for legitimacy as Brzezinski referred to earlier theories throughout his career in order to justify 
new arguments. While the continuality provided a cohesion throughout his theories, it also 
entrenched the defects of his earlier arguments throughout all of his publications. Many of the 
weaknesses within Brzezinski’s theories developed from his narrow understanding of ideology. 
* 
 The 1970s were the most critical decade for the Cold War. During this decade, the world 
both renounced its aged assumptions derived from the ashes of World War II and sought new 
answers to the postwar international dilemmas. Policy makers, with the lessons of the 1950s and 
1960s in mind, constructed alternatives to the inflexible strategies of the early Cold War. The 
strategies of the 1970s did not solely concern the basic survival of nations, but rather looked 
ahead towards an era of dependable international cooperation. In order to fulfill this vision, 
policy makers of the 1970s had to bridge the gap between an outdated bipolar world and a 
secure, interconnected one. How they would accomplish this unprecedented goal of global 
stability and what this stability would specifically look like were issues debated throughout the 
decade. Thus, the 1970s were not only a time of unparalleled ambition, but also a time when 
“communist cynics confronted liberal skeptics” in order to formulate new ideas and historical 
interpretations.”8 For the United States, its goal to make “the world safe for interdependence” 
was never a straightforward mission during this decade, but instead an ongoing debate with 
world security at stake.
 9
 
 The Nixon administration saw itself as the bringer of this new era of international 
cooperation and called for a completion of “what man’s genius [had] begun” with “new 
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beginnings.”10 To President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 
these “new beginnings” would develop from a thawing of international relations also known as 
“détente.” Despite its determination to alter American foreign policy, the administration’s 
assumptions and underlying objectives regarding the Soviet Union would not significantly differ 
from previous generations. The essential goal of détente from the White House, after all, was to 
contain Communism and halt the power of Moscow.
11
 The uniqueness of the Nixon 
administration’s policy was the way in which it sought to restrict Moscow’s reach – the 
administration took a dramatic and unprecedented diplomatic step by setting aside ideological 
differences in order to stabilize relations.
12
 This easing of tensions produced substantial results: 
SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were tangible developments that indicated a 
momentous change in how Washington and Moscow interacted. Moreover, these treaties could 
only have come from the climate of détente. In the eyes of the Nixon administration, a disregard 
for ideological differences was a prerequisite for global stability.   
 Détente also offered intellects and policy makers the opportunity to reinterpret the 
American-Soviet rivalry. To many Soviet-centric political scientists, détente was a long-awaited 
first step towards the inevitable total cooperation between the United States and the USSR. 
Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin first outlined such a hypothesis during the 1940s 
under the name the “convergence theory.” Sorokin proclaimed that the bureaucratic, industrial, 
and societal developments in both countries would become increasingly similar and that these 
similarities would stimulate cooperation regarding global affairs.
13
 Supporters of the 
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convergence theory argued that the US and USSR would eventually become democratic socialist 
societies “through liberalization in the East, and through socialization in the West.”14 This 
conclusion asserted that both countries had a crucial element that the other needed, placing them 
as antagonistic equals who would eventually become almost indistinguishable partners. Within 
this hypothesis, détente was hailed as a crucial stepping stone to total convergence. Andrei 
Sakharov, in his influential essay that began his clash with the Soviet government, asserted that 
the capitalist and communist worlds would not only naturally merge, but that if they resisted the 
implementation of détente that such resistance would spell out the “suicide of mankind.”15 
 To Brzezinski, the convergence theory did little more than calm the fears of those 
idealistic enough to support it.
16
 The very basic philosophical foundations of both societies – 
communism and liberalism – had developed into two systems which maintained themselves 
through opposing methods. The strengths of the Soviet system flowed “from the supremacy of its 
political ideology…and the political leaders’ ability to control,” while the advantages of the 
American system derived “from the close unity between society and polity.”17 The strengths of 
each system contradicted the strengths of the other. In order for these two societies to converge, 
both would have to incrementally shift towards the other. There was no incentive for either 
society to change as both had been highly successful “each in its own way.”18 Thus, détente was 
not an indication that the Soviet and American systems would converge. 
 Nor was the easing of tensions sustainable. Ideology would unavoidably reemerge as the 
great global divider as communism and liberalism provided a contrasting “global sense of 
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mission” for both societies.19 Philosophical differences would trounce efforts to “shape a new 
framework for international politics” because communism and liberalism had opposing long-
term priorities, however vague these priorities could be at times.
20
  Momentarily, détente would 
curtail the superpower rivalry, but SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty only assured a 
shallow unity between Moscow and Washington – and not one that gave Brzezinski confidence 
in future cooperative endeavors. “Rivalry between nations [was] inherent…without global 
consensus,” and global consensus was impossible with both Moscow and Washington at the 
helm of humanity.
21
 The competition between the superpowers was inevitable. 
 The fault for détente’s eventual failure would belong to the USSR. Through the 1970s, 
Soviet leaders would have to balance cooperating with leaders of the United States while 
simultaneously maintaining an obsolete ideologically-based political system. The “little help” the 
international sphere was receiving from the Soviet Union was likely to diminish as the Soviet 
system could not execute both a progressive international partnership and a domestic totalitarian 
system.
22
 When these contradictory goals collapsed on each other, Moscow would be forced to 
turn away from a global leadership role that it was inherently unprepared to accept. 
 Brzezinski asserted these predictions with such confidence because he built them on 
political theories that he had formulated early in his career. These theories focused almost 
exclusively on the Communist world, only referring to the role of America when it was in 
response to the Soviet system. First conceived during his doctorate years, his model of 
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totalitarianism deconstructed the USSR in order to analyze how it operated and how it would 
disintegrate. This model laid the foundation for the rest of Brzezinski’s intellectual career. In 
order to understand Brzezinski’s grand vision – which extended far beyond the 1970s – one must 
first analyze his model of totalitarianism. 
 Totalitarian dictatorships, Brzezinski argued in his 1965, were a “historically unique” 
phenomenon and systematically different from any other form of government.
23
 Totalitarianism 
developed from an autocratic precedent and carried on the basic characteristics of the latter. Most 
importantly, both had absolute power concentrated in one ideologically-charged individual. What 
divided the autocracies of the past and the totalitarian dictatorships of the twentieth century was 
the advent of modern technology. With the industrial revolution, a government had the ability to 
control virtually all aspects of society and could indoctrinate its population an ideological 
message in an effort “achieve the isolation of the individual and…mass monolithic 
homogeneity.”24 The uniqueness of a totalitarian government derived from its technological 
magnitude.  
 Unlike the autocratic governments of ancient Greece, Bonapartist France, or Tsarist 
Russia, totalitarian dictatorships access to modern technology allowed it to control “every nook 
and cranny” of a citizen’s life.25 From a central location, the totalitarian government 
monopolized communications, propaganda machines, education, and police terror.
26
 These 
dictatorships would then use these government bodies for the purposes of “control and 
manipulation of the masses,” in which an ideological doctrine was force-fed to society in order to 
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 Suddenly, the dictator’s message penetrated the home, school, and 
workplace unlike ever before possible. 
 This element of ideology was the most critical component in a totalitarian empire because 
it both propelled the actions of its leaders as well as justified these actions, both sought the 
control of society in order to manipulate humanity’s trajectory and authorized this manipulation. 
In his earliest publications, Brzezinski identified a total of six characteristics of totalitarian 
dictatorships – including a centralized political party, the use of terror, government monopoly of 
communications, government monopoly of the military, and a directed economy – but placed the 
use of an official ideology as the crown jewel of totalitarianism as the other elements of 
totalitarianism depended upon it.
28
  
 When analyzing ideology, Brzezinski specifically referred to a definition of his own 
design. In Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, he defined ideology as: 
 
“an action program suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumptions 
about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertions about 
the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the 
situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs.”29 
 
 In this narrow definition, ideologies include a “doctrinal component” as well as an 
“action program.30 The doctrinal component provides answers to key philosophical questions 
regarding the nature of humankind, historical developments, and the ultimate objectives of 
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society. It identifies the illness of a society and inspires the antidote – also known the “action 
program.”31 This action program responds to ideological doctrine by fulfilling its tenets through 
political and social methods. Devotees, with a “religious-like fervor,” work through the action 
program as a means for altering society.
32
 
 Adherents may at times alter specifics of the action program as geographical, cultural, 
and historical contexts call for different activity in order to best fulfill doctrinal tenets. 
Consequently, the doctrinal component is static – Communists from all generations may quote 
Karl Marx and agree to the same broad ideological concepts – while the action program is 
dynamic. The various action programs, however, must not deviate too far from each other or too 
far from the dominant ideological supervisor, who seeks to control these action programs 
through its totalitarian machine. In order to legitimize differences in action programs, deviants 
must claim that their action programs will lead to the same objective as their ideological 
overseer. 
Brzezinski applied this precise analysis of ideology to the Communist world. The USSR 
acted as the ideological overseer that attempted to control the political and social programs of all 
other Communist states. The goals of Soviet Communism that it forced upon its associates 
included the total defeat of capitalism, the success of an international worker’s revolution, and 
global centralization under Moscow.
33
 These goals were derived from the works of Karl Marx by 
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the USSR and - with perhaps the exception of the last ambition - were broadly agreed upon by 
most Communist states. 
But while most Communist governments agreed to the ends of Soviet Communism, they 
rarely agreed on the means by which to get there. As the twentieth century wore on, the action 
programs throughout the Communist world began to increasingly differ from each other. When 
similar disagreements occurred in autocracies of the past, empires split, governments dissolved, 
or else a new, more equal relationship formed between the ideological overseer and its adherents. 
However, the sheer magnitude of an ideology coupled with modern technology halted this 
natural disintegration of power. Indeed, Brzezinski predicted that the domination of totalitarian 
governments would only enlarge in response to the revised action programs of its subordinates.
34
 
For the Soviet Union, this struggle to maintain absolutism would characterize its future existence 
and doom it to a slow and painful erosion. 
* 
 Totalitarian ideologies are based on “absolute assumptions concerning reality.”35 A 
hundred years after the publication of The Communist Manifesto, leaders in Moscow continued 
to proclaim the same principles of class struggle and worker solidarity that Karl Marx first 
described during the mid-nineteenth century. This doctrinal component of ideology cannot be 
questioned or altered, lest it risk its very existence as a philosophy of certainty. In Soviet 
ideology, there is only one correct interpretation of history, one set of means to correct society, 
and one utopia to be reached. This claim to “infallible ideological insight,” Brzezinski lamented, 
produced the “arrogant self-righteousness so characteristic of contemporary Communism.”36 
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 Such assertions of ideological absolutism were also outdated because of their static 
nature. Specifically, Communism was “dead as an ideology” because it had nothing intellectual 
to offer the world by the mid-twentieth century as it resisted new ideas that threatened its 
existence.
37 
 In his grand scheme of intellectual history, Brzezinski categorized Marxism to an 
“age of volatile belief” along with nationalism and Christianity. These “institutionalized beliefs” 
contributed to the “maturing of man’s universal vision” in their prime, allowing man to 
reevaluate his existence and basic assumptions of society.
38
 These belief systems had bettered 
humanity during their intellectual peak. Marxism in particular had served as a bridge between 
preindustrial and industrial society as it mobilized the masses and centralized governments. The 
age of volatile belief was a critical phase for the intellectual development of humanity. 
 However, this age was supposed to naturally end when these ideologies came into 
conflict with ideas conceived after them. In the case of Communism, it outgrew its use when it 
became an “impediment to intellectual adaption.”39 Liberalism and democracy – not 
coincidentally born of the West - should have usurped its foundation in Eastern society. Instead, 
because of the industrial boom of the USSR, autocracy grew into totalitarianism and totalitarian 
forces were able to halt the influence of democracy, acting on the belief that their ideology was 
infallible. Totalitarianism was a perversion of the natural flow of humanity’s intellectual journey. 
It kept its population hostage in a prison of Marxist design, not allowing society to move forward 
in the natural evolution of intellectualism. 
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  In literal terms, the USSR resistance to progressing beyond the age of volatile belief 
meant that it was becoming increasingly “irrelevant” on the world stage.40 As it clung to 
Communism it could only watch as the West advanced intellectually and politically. The USSR 
was a static society, upholding “faded revolutionary slogans of the past” while America actively 
constructed new solutions to the dilemmas of the twentieth century.
41
 If the Communist world 
continued to resist the influx of new ideas and revised action programs, then it would eventually 
crumble under the weight of its own claims to infallibility.
42 
 
 Brzezinski believed that this process of disintegration had already begun to materialize. 
The proof lay with the constantly devolving relationship between the Soviet system and the rest 
of the Communist world. In The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Brzezinski analyzed the 
advancement  (spread of) of Soviet ideology following World War II, arguing that the 
association between Moscow and its weaker Communist neighbors had been a constant balance 
between “ideological unity and a recognition of domestic diversity” in which the Soviet 
government strove to claim and maintain dominance through its totalitarian reach.
43
  
 This precarious relationship began once Soviet-supported Communist parties began to 
take control of their governments in the latter years of World War II. Under the protection of the 
Red Army, Eastern Europe became a “zone of eventual revolution” in which the Soviet 
government collaborated with local Communists in order to rebuild the war-torn countries in the 
name of Communist ideology.
44
 Subsequently, communism in satellite states took on various 
forms through locally distinct action programs, with ideological modifications made when local 
necessities called for such.  
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 At first the allowance for ideological diversity developed from a genuine concern that 
Eastern Europe was not “ripe” for a duplication of the Soviet experiences.45 The Soviet 
government was satisfied to compromise Soviet absolutism in the short term as it allowed 
Moscow to penetrate the political systems of Eastern Europe for long term gains.
46
 Perhaps most 
noteworthy, the USSR sanctioned Communists throughout Eastern Europe to identify with local 
nationalist sentiments just as strongly as they did Communist doctrine. This maneuver was not 
considered a loathsome ideological concession, but rather a “sensible adjustment to the 
requirements of the situation” during the late 1940s.47 
 This allowance for diversity ended during the postwar years when it had “outlived its 
usefulness.”48 Immediately following the war and under the leadership of Josef Stalin, the Soviet 
government insisted that “its experience in building socialism be the slide rule for all domestic 
calculations of the ruling Communist parties.”49 The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by 
Moscow forcing ideological uniformity on Eastern Europe in order to stay dominate. Satellite 
governments ceased being “candidates for partnership” with the USSR and instead “became the 
embryos” for the totalitarian Soviet system50. Although this policy change was sudden, the 
USSR’s implementation of uniformity was an ongoing process in which Soviet leaders still had 
to allow some levels of ideological diversity, if only to lessen the chances of open rebellion or 
American intervention.
51
 Despite this allowance, Moscow’s longstanding aim was to curtail 
ideological diversity and bring all Communist societies under Soviet Communism.  
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 Stalin’s particular form of Soviet Communism was rather persuasive as it included mass 
violence and waves of purges. At first this strategy garnered success. Brzezinski argued that 
Eastern European leaders rushed to proclaim their “blind devotion to the USSR” and Soviet 
doctrine during the Stalinist period because they calculated close relations with Moscow to be 
politically and personally advantageous.
52
 The cult of Stalinism swept through the governments 
of Eastern Europe as Communist leaders emulated the methods of Stalin, sanctioned the dramatic 
increase of political purges, and the Soviet model became “duplicated in every factory, 
enterprise, town, or village.”53 The sudden increase in ideological uniformity in the Communist 
camp was so great that it even brought the “very purpose of separate statehood” into question as 




 These achievements did not last long. Several events occurring at once brought Stalin’s 
policies to a grinding halt and prompted the “search for a new formula for unity” between 
Communist states and the USSR.
55
 With Stalin’s death in 1953, Communist leaders lost their 
source for political inspiration. Never again would a Soviet leader generate a cult-like following 
that included such a thorough emulation of style. Paradoxically, Communist leaders also lost the 
“personal fear” they had felt towards Stalin.56 Now, satellite states and the populations within 
them could speak more openly regarding their nation’s individual needs without the anxiety of 
being purged.  
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 Despite the general success of Stalin’s Soviet Communism as a unifying force, the calls 
for reform quickly rose after 1953. The nationalist sentiments within the satellite states had never 
fully submitted to the Soviet-centric Communist agenda and as the decade wore on it became 
apparent that Soviet methods of Communism were not always so easily applied to other states. 
The call for ideological revisionism echoed throughout the Communist world - populations and 
leaders demanded the freedom to create action programs based on their own national, economic, 
and cultural needs. Likewise, the growing tensions between Yugoslavia and the People’s 
Republic of China towards the USSR demonstrated that Communist ideology could be 
reinterpreted and applied successfully outside the watch of Moscow. The smaller members of the 
Communist world could not help but notice the rift between these larger states and wonder if 
they too could achieve a higher level of ideological flexibility.
57
  
 Within the context of these post- Stalin developments, fragmentation ensued and the 
ideological “thaw” under Nikita Khrushchev turned into a “deluge.”58 In 1955, diplomatic 
relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR officially ended due to Josip Tito’s continued 
refusal to submit to the demands of Moscow. Yugoslavia became a Titoist island in a sea of post-
Stalin ideological turmoil, “export[ing]” a message of self-determination to the rest of the 
Communist world.
59
 This message did not fall on deaf ears. In 1956 and 1968 Hungarians and 
Czechoslovakians rose up against the dominance of Moscow and demanded greater autonomy 
from the ideological overseer. These revolts ended with Soviet tanks rolling down city streets, 
mass arrests, and the tightening of the totalitarian’s grip. The USSR would not easily submit to 
ideological dissent. 
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 The most “tragic disaster” for international Communism occurred in 1961.60  The Sino-
Soviet split was largely caused by disagreements regarding revisionism over ideology that 
resulted in an inter-continental power struggle.
61
 After Stalin’s death, the People’s Republic of 
China had increasingly challenged the USSR on international issues and in 1961 publically 
accused Moscow of desecrating Marxist doctrine. A permanent divide ensued, and the 
antagonism became the turning point in the USSR’s pursuit of ideological conformity. The 
Soviet system never recovered from the ideological implications of the split. The USSR could 
continue to criticize the island of Titoism and suppress revisionists in the satellite states, but it 
could not so easily conceal the ideology-fused divergence between itself and the second largest 
Communist power in the world. The split discredited Communism as an international solidifying 
force and “ideologically demoralized the true believers.”62 The PRC’s mere existence proved to 
the world that ideological absolutism was obsolete and that revisionism was a legitimate 
foundation from which to build a Communist society.  
 Brzezinski argued that these ideological cracks would eventually lead to Soviet system’s 
shattering. Revisionism and nationalism would only increase in frequency as Eastern European 
leaders “inevitab[ly]” developed “greater confidence in ruling” without direct Soviet 
management.
63
 The chaos also offered new diplomatic options to Communist states. Complete 
subordination or division became extreme positions on a scale of diplomatic possibilities. 
Poland, for instance, enjoyed a level of domestic autonomy under Wladyslaw Gomulka and 
Albania remained an official political partner of the USSR despite growing tensions between the 
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 With the fragmentation of the Communist world, the USSR had to negotiate its relations 
with each individual state, sometimes conceding its demand of absolute political unity. To do 
otherwise risked losing more members of its Communist camp, who could then form alliances 
with Yugoslavia or the PRC. 
 These were ideological and political concessions that the Soviet system had to endure in 
order survive. The USSR could not return to a time of Stalinist Communism in which Moscow 
squeezed its neighbors into submission. Doing so would be to admit to the world that 
internationalist Communist harmony was little more than a façade. Brzezinski also questioned 
the USSR’s ability to militarily challenge the PRC or reach such distant opponents such as 
Albania.
65
 By the mid-1960s, the Soviet government was forced to accept that ideological 
revisionism would continue despite its long-term “apocalyptic significance.”66 The question 
became not how the USSR could effectively halt revisionism, but how much revisionism it could 
allow before it threatened to divide and destroy the entire totalitarian regime.
67
  
 The political balancing act that was to follow would be drenched in blood. Brzezinski 
envisioned future oscillations between stability and terror within the Soviet bloc: stability when 
Moscow quietly allowed revisionism and terror when that revisionism grew to outright threaten 
the USSR’s power. Uprisings similar to those that had occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
would increase, calling for the Soviets to either violently repress such rebellions or else submit to 
a curtailing of power. The USSR would eventually be forced to relent after waves of revisionism 
and violence had eroded the Soviet system. Militarily, the Soviets would not have the resources 
to continue suppressing its neighbors, diplomatically, the West would be morally obligated to cut 
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off economic and political ties to the Soviets, and ideologically, the Soviets would be forced to 
recognize the legitimacy of alternative forms of Communism. With this loss of power and 
ideological absolutism, the totalitarian empire would one day crumble. 
 Brzezinski refrained from predicting precisely how future uprisings would develop or 
how Moscow would respond to such uprisings. Revisionism was certain as was its ability to 
undermine the Soviet system, but the details of how and when were mere speculation. He 
claimed that “splits or…the development of a silent agreement to disagree” were both equally 
plausible.
68
 The bloc was “not splitting and…not likely to split” in the near future, indicating that 
he thought Moscow would allow an amount of ideological flexibility in the political agendas of 
its neighbors.
69
 However, he simultaneously warned that the USSR may reassert itself 
ideologically, demanding submission from satellite states and using terror to ensure such. Soviet 
ideology could no longer “meaningfully reflect or shape reality in the Eastern European context” 
without the use of violence.
 70
 The ‘conservative’ forces of ideology,” he cautioned, had not “lost 
their capacity to exert influence” and would not relent power without a struggle.71 The USSR 
was still totalitarian and at its core would likely “become more total” as totalitarian machines 
tended to do.
72
 Brzezinski fully expected the Soviets to use every last resource to protect their 
empire.  
 The inconsistency of this last piece of Brzezinski’s totalitarian model suggests that 
aspects of the entire theory be questioned. Much of Brzezinski’s model argues the inevitable: the 
inevitability of a Soviet-American rivalry, the inevitability of ideological revisionism, and the 
inevitability of future Soviet terror all leading to the inevitability of the USSR’s disintegration. 
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However, he fails to adequately explain why these individual events are unavoidable. Brzezinski 
predicts a future of fluctuation between ideological revisionism and Soviet terror within the 
Communist world and argues that the totalitarian grip will not lessen until it is absolutely forced 
to do so. This is not a prediction of voluntary reform, but one of messy, horrifying collapse. Is it 
not possible that at some point the USSR may willingly chose to reevaluate its diplomatic system 
without first exerting every last resource at its disposal? Could not the totalitarian fist open, if 
only incrementally?  
 Perhaps the prediction of unavoidable events becomes more understandable within the 
context of Brzezinski’s definition of ideology. His narrow definition was crafted specifically 
concerning totalitarianism and does not apply to any other form of government. Indeed, the 
characteristics of Brzezinski’s definition of ideology do not apply to non-totalitarian 
governments as the concepts of absolutist doctrine and action programs remain foreign in 
Western governments. Brzezinski specifically avoids associating the United States with an 
ideology, at best calling mainstream American thought a “value system.”73  
 Brzezinski’s argument that totalitarianism is an anomaly of history holds up against 
scrutiny – the industrial revolution significantly effected almost all forms of government – but 
one must question the value of a definition formulated within a Soviet-centric bubble. The 
overriding issue with Brzezinski’s definition of ideology is that it acts as proof of his predictions 
instead of history verifying his definition. According to his interpretation of ideology, the world 
should expect the totalitarian USSR to refuse to lessen its grip because of its inherent ideological 
nature. Such a precise analysis of the Soviet system would certainly come into problems when a 
wave of ideological revisionism occurs, as it did during the late 1950s and 1960s. The success of 
this revisionism, although limited, throws an unforeseen complication at the totalitarian model 
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that Brzezinski struggles to reconcile within his grand vision. If the USSR were completely true 
to its absolute ideology as Brzezinski claims, then it would not have allowed any form of 
revisionism to occur. 
 Paradoxically, this complication supports Brzezinski’s argument regarding the age of 
violate belief. Brzezinski argued that Soviet Communism perverted the natural journey of 
humankind by forcing intellectualism to come to a halt. Through claims of absolutism, ideology 
kept humankind prisoner in the age of violate belief. Revisionism contradicted this absolutism by 
demonstrating that ideology was susceptible to change without risking the whole of its existence. 
The revisionism of the 1950s and 1960s proved that the age of violate belief had ended.
 Despite the inconsistencies found throughout Brzezinski’s theory, he maintained many of 
his broader claims throughout his early career. Throughout his many publications, he specifically 
warned that the impending implosion should “be awaited with a great deal of patience.”74 
* 
 “The prophets of history may be gradually becoming its prisoners,” Brzezinski 
proclaimed in 1962, “and the time has now come for the West to prod history along.”75 These 
concluding words of Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics broadly illustrate the grand mission 
the Polish-born academic envisioned for the United States. American exceptionalism, conceived 
from its institutions of liberalism and democracy and its genius of creativity, destined the country 
to lead the world in the development of a “global human conscience.”76  
 Much of America’s immediate role in the world would be in response to the dramatic 
changes occurring in Eastern Europe. Brzezinski constructed this role through a dual policy he 
labeled “peaceful engagement.” Within Brzezinski’s grand scheme of humanity, peaceful 
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engagement would demonstrate America’s political and moral superiority as well as its ability to 
lead the world into an era of intellectual, political, and economic globalization. In the immediate 
decades, it incorporated strategies concerning both Communist regimes and “the peoples they 
rule[d]” by focusing on cultural, intellectual, and economic reform as well as specific Europeans 
problems.
77
 Peaceful engagement’s comprehensive goal was to accelerate ideological 
revisionism in the Communist world in order to hasten the Soviet system’s eventual collapse. 
However, this policy risked creating mass unrest and lacked a formulaic role of Soviet dissidents 
who were a significantly component to the dismantling of the Soviet system. 
 America purpose in the twentieth century was to act as both a “social pioneer 
and…guinea pig” for humanity.78 It thrived as the greatest creative force in history because it 
allowed its social, economic, and political forces to “openly clash,” encouraging an everlasting 
competition of ideas.
79
 This process was both creative and destructive as it continually brought 
about domestic “metamorphic changes” in which only the optimal solutions survived.80 Whereas 
the Soviet system attempted to control the influx of ideas through “indoctrination and direct 
politization of its citizens,” the American system openly encouraged its populace to produce and 
debate ideas.
81
 While the American system was admittedly more chaotic, it was ultimately more 
successful. The progression of ideas could be momentarily impeded by totalitarian efforts, but it 
could never be fully stopped. 
 The United States’ ability to export its ideas abroad meant that it had the moral and 
political responsibility to influence the trajectory of humanity. American international 
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involvement was already “prompting a far-reaching cumulative transformation” throughout 
societies, but needed to be further expanded so that the United States could lead the world into an 
era of intellectual and political globalization. Brzezinski insisted upon the crucial nature of this 
responsibility: The United States’ success in creating “a healthy democratic society” held 
“promise for a world…dominated by ideological and racial conflicts, by economic and social 
injustice.”82 America was to lead by example and aid the transformation of societies into an era 
of international cooperation under its guidance. The United States success would be humanity 
success, its failure, humanity’s failure.83 Moreover, the superpower had the obligation to accept 
this historically monumental role as the country’s “disinvolvement” would allow the Soviet 
Union to expand its sphere of influence and subsequently cause “international chaos of enormous 
proportions.”84  
 America had not always readily accepted this leadership position. Brzezinski argued that 
in the postwar years the American government never offered “a realistic and effective foreign 
policy concerning Eastern Europe.”85 The policy of containment, passive and vague in its 
approach, had resulted in the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe because it did not directly 
challenge Communist expansion.
86
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the American government 
verbally castigated Moscow for its brutality against the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian people, 
but was unwilling to become directly involved in such disputes. To Brzezinski, these instances of 
American reluctance demonstrated to the USSR that it would not become involved in future 
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conflicts, but quietly submit to the Soviet Union’s brutal foreign policy.87 The United States 
needed to reverse this trend of compliance and assert a clearer stance against the totalitarian 
regime in order to subvert the USSR and demonstrate its commitment to international liberalism. 
 Détente did not offer a long-term framework for such a modification of American foreign 
policy, particularly because it further signified American unwillingness to confront the Soviet 
empire. The “dissipation of American leadership” began once the superpowers established 
ideological neutrality and thereby threatened to further reduce the United States’ involvement in 
Eastern Europe.
88
 Thus, détente favored the USSR because it granted Moscow the right to 
supervise the Communist camp according to its own political agenda instead of under an 
international partnership. The easing of tensions was not an endgame of the Cold War as many 
Americans understood it to be, but rather a momentary lapse of the United States’ power and 
political sensibility that left the nation – and states dominated by the totalitarian giant - exposed 
and politically paralyzed. 
 Despite the weaknesses of détente, Brzezinski argued that American policy makers could 
take advantage of the long-term changing global environment if they reformed their strategies to 
include a clear policy towards Eastern Europe.
89
 Peaceful engagement would offer an active 
strategy that aimed to encourage “a greater measure of political independence” for satellite 
states. Eventually, this would lead to “the creation of a neutral belt” of nations which “would 
enjoy genuine popular freedom of choice in internal policy while not being hostile to the Soviet 
Union and not belonging to Western military alliances.”90 Peaceful engagement did not seek to 
rip Eastern Europe away from the USSR as this would cause international turmoil. Instead, its 
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goal was to increase the power of Eastern European states, diminish the strength of the Soviet 
Union, and encourage “the American long-range goal of a free and pluralistic world with 
diversity of political and social structures.”91 
 An increased cultural, and intellectual exchange between the West and East would act as 
the first step to fulfilling these goals. In order to increase the flow of ideas across the Atlantic, 
exchange could not be limited to only scientific and artistic fields as it had been in previous 
decades. The American government needed to encourage at least a “balanced representation…of 
the humanities and social sciences” in an effort to directly subvert the impact of Soviet 
Communist ideology on Eastern Europe.
92
 Reawakening prewar relations between Western and 
Eastern Europe, investing in “popular goodwill” projects such as the reconstruction of the Royal 
Castle in Warsaw, and offering more American-funded university scholarships to Eastern 
European students would serve as threads in a larger tapestry of change.
93
 The United States 
government also needed to fund non-government organizations such as Free Radio Europe, 
whose semiofficial status permitted it to comment on international affairs freely.
94
 Free Radio 
Europe’s ability to penetrate the iron curtain elevated its status to that of an irreplaceable weapon 
for the West that the American government needed to maintain at all costs.
95
  
 The United States also needed to expand its economic ties with Eastern Europe. By 
developing stronger economic partnerships, Communist states would begin looking towards the 
West for political inspiration. The “nonideological character” of economic and industrial 
developments particularly threatened “the ideological structure that reinforce[d] the…political 
division of Europe” because it gave Eastern European states incentive to uphold long-term 
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peaceful relations between the West and East despite political differences.
96
 The American 
government needed to install a policy of economic rewards regarding the Communist camp in 
order to accelerate this process of economic relations. A European country would be rewarded 
whenever it “increas[ed] the scope of its external independence from Soviet control” or 
“appreciably liberaliz[ed] its domestic system.”97 Satellite states would be tempted by such 
candid policy, which would help to fulfill the consumer demands of their populace. 
 Peaceful engagement also included strategies to settle many of the traditional 
antagonisms in Europe, in the goal of moving the continent into a globalized era under American 
supervision. Specifically, peaceful engagement designed formulas to reconcile relations between 
West Germany and East Germany, settle the Oder-Neisse border dispute between Germany and 
Poland, and mediate Czechoslovakia’s ethnic tensions.98 These ambitious goals were vital in the 
context of the US-USSR rivalry. As the Soviet Union had failed to reconcile these intrinsic 
problems on its own accord, the United States could fulfill the vital role as international 
negotiator. By leading these compromises in the USSR’s sphere of influence the United States 
would signify its preponderance as the superior world power and set a precedent of Eastern 
Europe deferring to the West for stability and leadership. 
 The extensive goals of peaceful engagement were not ends in themselves, but rather 
interlaced policies meant to lay a foundation for American global leadership. While the ambition 
of peaceful engagement was moral as well as political, Brzezinski specifically warned that 
“without clearer and more reasoned answers” American policy would “become dissipated in a 
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euphoria of politically meaningless goodwill.”99 In order for peaceful engagement to be 
successful, the United States needed to approach all of its ambitions with a singular immediate 
objective: to undermine the Soviet system.  
 Brzezinski designed his policies to fulfill this goal. As the USSR was to fall victim to 
ideological revisionism, the policies of peaceful engagement – from its cultural and intellectual 
exchange and economic incentives as well as its formula for settling European tensions – were 
essentially revisionist programs sponsored by the American government. The elements of 
peaceful engagement sought to alter the ideological foundations of the Communist world by 
driving a wedge between Moscow and its neighbors, allowing the latter the freedom to interpret 
and apply Communist doctrine as they saw appropriate. These policies offered Eastern European 
countries the opportunity to participate in America’s globalization effort as well as the 
motivation to uphold peaceful international relations. Within a few decades time, American-
approved revisionism would have worn away at the totalitarian giant, creating a neutral region of 
nations and allowing the United States to advance humanity into an era of globalization 
unhindered. 
 However, peaceful engagement failed to account for its radicalizing effect on the 
populations of satellite states. The strategies of peaceful engagement reached out to Eastern 
European governments and citizens alike, offering alternatives to their society’s fundamental 
principles. Although this long-term plan was not meant to haphazardly “liberate” states of the 
Communist camp from Moscow’s domination, it aimed to thoroughly convert Eastern European 
populations to a more liberal lifestyle and political structure.
100
 However, peaceful engagement 
failed to directly explain how the American government was to generate this conversion without 
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overly radicalizing Eastern European populations. Is it not possible that an American attempt to 
instigate modest reform would open the floodgates of chaotic revolution? Could the supporters 
of the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian uprisings, the nationalists of Ukraine and Romania, and 
reformists of Albania interpret peaceful engagement as their opportunity to fully break with 
Moscow?  
 Such hypothetical events increase in possibility within the context of Brzezinski’s 
analysis of the Soviet system’s collapse. According to his analysis, revisionism would cause an 
oscillation between reform and Soviet terror in which the slow break down of Soviet power 
would occur. Although the end to the Soviet system was inevitable, this process of reform and 
violence, according to Brzezinski, would endure for generations. By encouraging revisionism, 
the United States risked causing mass violence as peaceful engagement did not describe how to 
effectively generate reform without provoking Soviet reaction. Brzezinski criticized the policies 
of containment and détente because they failed to assert American leadership, but if the events of 
the Hungarian or Czechoslovakian uprisings were to reoccur, would the United States be 
prepared to involve itself directly in these conflict? Would not peaceful engagement signal to the 
satellite states that they had American support? Revisionism had the potential to unravel into 
turmoil and the populations of Eastern Europe would be the victims of this American-induced 
chaos. 
 This oversight left Soviet dissidents and reformers – two categories which commonly 
overlapped - exposed. Brzezinski’s exclusion of dissidents from peaceful engagement derives not 
from his assumption that they did not exist or would not increase in number, but rather from the 
simple fact that they did not so easily integrate into his foreign policy. Indeed, from his earliest 
writing Brzezinski proclaimed that even within totalitarian regimes “some people manage to 
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maintain themselves aloof, to live in accordance with their personal convictions, and perhaps to 
organize some minor opposition.”101 Passive and active resistance occurred in the religious, 
family, intellectual, and military spheres, and promoted nationalist or liberalist agendas. That 
these forms of opposition broadly ranged in goals and identity and existed under the watch of a 
government that sought to crush them meant that all expectations for their isolated success in 
overthrowing the totalitarian government were “utopian delusions.”102 
 Yet despite the shortcomings of these dissident groups, resisting the totalitarian machine 
was “morally required” of all humanity.103 For dissidents in Eastern Europe this meant risking 
their lives by calling for reform, while for the American government it meant incrementally 
aiding reformers on a broad scale via peaceful engagement. Brzezinski failed to adequately 
connect these two roles: peaceful engagement encouraged activism from reformers and 
dissidents with the intention of using their efforts to slowly undermine the Soviet system, but 
excluded a plan to protect these groups from potential Soviet backlash.  
 Brzezinski’s predictions concerning the near future of the Communist world complicated 
this oversight. He foresaw a dramatic increase of nationalist and intellectual dissidents, 
specifically calling attention to Andrei Sakharov’s manifesto of international cooperation and its 
declaration of Communist reform.
104
 Brzezinski also fully expected the Communist world to 
experience a synergy of resistance from students and ideological dissenters in the coming 
decade.
105
 The “outbursts of 1968,” which included student protests in the USSR and Poland as 
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well as the Czechoslovakian uprising, were to be “repeated in the 1970s.”106 According to 
Brzezinski’s prediction regarding the oscillation between reform and Soviet terror, the Soviet 
system would respond to these non-conformists with a wave of violence. As peaceful 
engagement offered no comprehensive strategy to protect these reformists, one can only assume 
that Brzezinski was willing to risk mass violence in order to achieve the goals of his policy.  
* 
  Brzezinski’s arguments are neither simple nor easily distilled. He used the two decades 
prior to his position as National Security Advisor to progressively develop theories that he 
believed could alter the Cold War and, indeed, the destiny of humanity. In 1970, when he 
published the most distinguished book of his pre-Carter career, Between Two Ages: America’s 
Role in the Technetronic Era, he still referred to his early totalitarian models that he had 
constructed during his doctorate years. This continuality provides a layer of cohesion within his 
arguments which allows the reader to better comprehend Brzezinski’s short-term concepts within 
a larger context of his grand vision for the world. 
 However, this continuality also entrenched the shortcomings of Brzezinski’s early 
arguments into all of his later work. Most of the defects found in Brzezinski’s theories derived 
from his understanding of ideology. His insistence that ideology only existed as an absolute 
philosophy did not reconcile with the revisionism that occurred during the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Communist ideology survived these early stages of reform. In response to these unforeseen 
events, Brzezinski altered his theory of absolutism to argue that revisionism acted as the chisel 
that chipped away at the totalitarian monster, but still failed to account for the details of how this 
disintegration would occur. Additionally, this failure to describe the collapse of the totalitarian 
giant percolated into his theory of peaceful engagement. By not understanding the details of how 
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revisionism would take place within the Communist world, Brzezinski did not account for the 
protection of dissidents and reformers despite peaceful engagement relying in part on their 
participation. This hole in his foreign policy potentially submitted the populations of Eastern 
Europe to a revival of Soviet aggression. 
 Both the successes and failures of Brzezinski’s work would play an active role in how he 
performed his duties as National Security Advisor in the Carter administration. While his 
specific intellectual shortcomings regarding Soviet dissidents played only a minor role in his 
broad scheme of the USSR’s collapse pre-1977, the human rights goals of the Carter 
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 Brzezinski’s pre-Carter analyses focused on the early twentieth century and offered a 
vision of a future era, but failed precisely describe how America was to operate in order to reach 
this future. With his advancement to National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter, 
Brzezinski was able to test many of his ideas regarding the Soviet system and demonstrate how 
the government should act in order to fulfill his vision of American supremacy. The 
humanitarian focus of the administration offered him the opportunity to reconstruct many of his 
policies. Although his interaction with human rights organizations before 1977 was limited, 
Brzezinski readily integrated his analysis of the Soviet system with Carter’s human rights 
crusade. The result of this integration was the use of human rights as a political tool that he used 
to undermine the Soviet Union. Brzezinski used this political tool throughout his White House 
career with mixed success 
 Brzezinski’s term as National Security Adviser is critical because it demonstrates how he 
believed the United States needed to act during the current period of the Cold War. His 
involvement with the Sakharov letter, SALT II proposals, and 1979 prisoner exchange show that 
Brzezinski believed an assertive policy was the only policy for the United States. Much of his 
confidence came from his belief that détente would eventually fail and that the Soviet system 
would inevitably crumble. However, this strategy succeeded only when the Americans had the 
initial advantage.  
* 
 In addition to his scholarly works, Brzezinski’s political endeavors aided his transition 
into the Carter administration. He accepted a teaching position at Columbia University in 1959 
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and founded the Research Institute on Communist Affairs. Over the next decade and a half, he 
advised Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon on foreign policy affairs and took the role of 
director in Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s foreign policy task force.107 His rise to 
prominence – as well as his quick-witted and short-tempered personality – did not go unnoticed 
by the nation. “…Even those whom he sometimes rubs the wrong way,” a 1966 Newsweek 
article claimed, “readily admit that Brzezinski is a veritable dynamo of fresh ideas.”108 
 During this time, Brzezinski also gained membership to both the Council of Foreign 
Relations and the Brookings Institution. He gained international experiences outside of Eastern 
Europe through these organizations. Most notably he published The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and 
Change in Japan in 1972 after a one year study in Tokyo and participated in an analysis of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1974 and 1975.
109
 Alongside David Rockefeller, Brzezinski also 
founded the Trilateral Commission, a multinational non-government think tank that analyzed 
global challenges. In his everlasting search for talent, Brzezinski requested extending 
membership of the Trilateral Commission to an eager Georgian politician who was quickly 
advancing through his state’s political ranks. In 1973, Brzezinski welcomed Jimmy Carter into 
the commission. The following year Carter declared his candidacy for President. 
 Brzezinski supported Carter’s bid for the White House early in the presidential race when 
most thought that the Georgian governor would be fortunate to be considered for the vice 
presidency. Yet, Carter’s enthusiasm to understand global affairs and his genuine and kind 
demeanor made Brzezinski a “believer” of the southern candidate’s ambition to lead the nation. 
This new believer approached Carter, offering his intellectual and political support to which 
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Carter readily accepted. Brzezinski began submitting to him foreign policy papers on a regular 
basis and eventually became his chief foreign policy adviser.
110
  
 As adviser, Brzezinski shaped many of the would-be President’s foreign policy opinions 
as Carter had limited foreign policy training. Brzezinski calculated Carter’s inexperience as a 
potential opportunity for himself to play a deeply compelling role in the administration. In 
Brzezinski’s own words, Carter “needed someone like me to do what I was doing,” which meant 
asserting policies that put the Soviets on the defense and holding firm in these policies.
111
 Not 
coincidentally, these policies were almost always of Brzezinski’s own design. Carter, who 
admired Brzezinski’s depth of knowledge, considered himself “an eager student” of the 
Sovietologist scholar and accepted Brzezinski’s analysis of the Soviet system as a totalitarian 
empire.
112
 A complex but close relationship formed. 
 Brzezinski supported and respected Cater because of the candidate’s human rights 
advocacy, which he interpreted as having potential for the American government both morally 
and politically. From the first policy papers he submitted to Carter during the election, 
Brzezinski sought to combine the Georgian’s idealistic human rights campaign with his own 
interpretation of international relations. “Power,” Brzezinski claimed, needed to be used “for 
attaining morally desirable ends,” which included undermining the Soviet system through the 
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political reforms Brzezinski had promoted in peaceful engagement.
113
 Although the Columbian 
professor had limited experience with humanitarian activism, he “felt strongly that a major 
emphasis on human rights as a component of US foreign policy would advance America’s global 
interests by demonstrating…the reality of [America’s] democratic system.” The United States’ 
human rights campaign was not just for the domestic population, but also a statement to the 
world that American was protector of the oppressed. 
 Despite the global appeal Brzezinski believed this message would have, he intended the 
USSR to be the focus of the American government’s efforts. Brzezinski wanted to emphasize 
Soviet human rights abuses so that the administration could manipulate these abuses into a 
political tool. By focusing on abuses in the USSR, Washington could both embarrass Moscow on 
the world stage and rally the West under American authority. The most advantageous way to 
“answer the Soviets’ ideological challenge” and demonstrate global leadership was to “commit 
the United States to a concept which most reflected America’s very essence,” meaning the 
expansion and protection of human rights.
114
 Although he successfully integrated Carter’s 
idealism with his own analysis of US-USSR relations, Brzezinski’s argued that human rights best 
served the American government as a political tool while Carter considered them to be the 
inherent “fundamental spiritual requirements” of a government.115 The realist and idealist could 
agree upon a policy centered on human rights, but for strikingly different reasons. 
 Despite this difference, both men believed human rights would play a critical role in the 
future of humankind and international relations. Carter believed that “the expansion of human 
rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world” and “wanted the United States to be 
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on the crest of this movement.” This desire to set an example to the world justified basing 
relationships with other governments off of “their performance in providing basic freedoms to 
their people.”116 To Brzezinski, a presidency under Carter would be a fulfillment of the Polish-
American’s vision for the world. Human rights would be a significant component of evolving 
global consciousness and America’s role as leader of the free world would “hold promise” for 
societies struggling to transition into this era of international cooperation.
117
 Both men based 
their claims on the idea that human rights were not a momentary phenomenon, but rather an 
element of an approaching era in which the expansion of natural rights would liberate 
undemocratic societies and globalize the world. As the crusade grew internationally, the United 
States would be hailed as the conductor and protector of freedom. 
 With the inauguration of Carter in 1977 and his advancement to National Security 
Adviser, Brzezinski had the opportunity to demonstrate how the United States would fulfill this 
long term vision. Brzezinski’s pre-Carter publications failed to explain how American foreign 
policy needed to operate in the immediate era in order to reach its long term goals of world 
leadership and revisionism in Eastern Europe. His term as National Security Adviser would fill 
this void in his thinking by directly showing how he believed the American government needed 
to act in the present time. 
 Brzezinski first demonstrated how he believed the American government to act by 
constructing a list of ten goals for the administration. The National Security Adviser placed 
American-Soviet relations as forth on this list, first citing SALT II’s desired deadline for early 
1978 in the effort to quickly and effectively “lay the basis for a more stable relationship” with 
the USSR. He also maintained that “the United States would counter Soviet ideological claims 
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by assuming a more affirmative commitment to human rights.” This commitment extended to 
rebuffing “Soviet incursions…by supporting friends,” which included any political body or 
persons who supported the United States extending its influence into Eastern Europe. Human 
rights, which had its own category as ninth on Brzezinski’s list, specifically included the goal to 
expand America’s refugee programs for “those fleeing oppressive left-wing and right-wing 
regimes.”118  
 The synergy between Brzezinski’s Soviet-centralism and human rights created a policy 
that aimed to both negotiate with the Soviet Union as well as directly criticize them. Brzezinski 
did not consider putting the Soviet Union “ideologically on the defensive” while holding SALT 
II talks to be contradictory.
119
 He was confident that the Soviet system was inherently unstable 
and would eventually collapse no matter what the negotiation details of SALT II. Brzezinski was 
also optimistic that history would approve of the Carter administration’s decision to place such a 
high value on human rights as the next era of humanity would be based on a liberal global 
awareness. Thus, these certainties - derived from his pre-Carter analyses - gave Brzezinski the 
confidence to implement a human rights-based policy that sought to both shake hands with 
Moscow while waging a stern finger at its leaders. 
* 
 The opportunity to test Brzezinski’s policy arose almost immediately. On January 21, the 
day following Carter’s inauguration, Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov wrote a letter to the P 
President in which he appealed to Carter’s humanitarian convictions and asked for help in the 
protection of Soviet dissidents. Without Sakharov’s knowledge, the letter was handed over to the 
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American media which widely published it. This publicity meant that the Carter administration 
needed to response openly to the dissident. To do otherwise would risk a comparison to President 
General Ford’s 1975 refusal to meet with Soviet activist Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn and tarnish 
Carter’s image as a President who genuinely believed in human rights.  
 However, at the same time of the Sakharov letter the administration was attempting to 
establish relations with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in an effort to develop a “personal 
relationship” between the leaders. Brzezinski suggested that Carter write to Brezhnev and 
“assure” him that the administration’s human rights goals would not solely focus on the USSR, 
but be global.
120
 While this claim was not true, Brzezinski calculated that such a letter would 
reinvigorate American-Soviet relations and help make way for a quick SALT II agreement. 
Brzezinski played a major role in both of these exchanges, constructing the response to Sakharov 
as well as working alongside Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in order to write to Brezhnev. 
These correspondences were the first test of Brzezinski’s dual policy of criticizing the Soviet 
Union while simultaneously trying to negotiate with its leaders. He failed to satisfactorily fulfill 
either of these goals. 
 Brzezinski’s first opportunity to put the Soviet’s on the ideologically defense came in the 
form of Sakharov’s letter. The scientist’s appeal to Carter developed out of a renewed human 
rights crusade in the USSR during the late 1960s and 1970s. Through Basket III of the Helsinki 
Accords, nations vowed to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” which derived 
“from the inherent dignity of the human person.”121 The international agreement became the 
catalyst for the reawakening and reorganizing of the Soviet dissident cause. Days after the 
signing, members of Congress visiting the USSR were pleasantly surprised to find activists, 
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including Sakharov, assembling an organization that would eventually become the Moscow 
Helsinki Watch Group. The organization had the potential to greatly influence international 
perception of human rights in the USSR as it drew legitimacy from Basket III and also benefitted 
from an invigorated solidarity between literary, religious, and political activists.
122
 The Moscow 
organization quickly inspired the creation of watch groups throughout the Soviet Union, 
formulating “small but highly active opposition organizations” that were significantly more 
centralized than previous groups.
123
 
 The Soviet government became aware of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group 
immediately, noting with alarm that the organization planned to rely heavily on “Western public 
opinion to put pressure on the Soviet government.”124 Moscow responded by persecuting 
dissidents of the organization. In the weeks surrounding the new year of 1977, Soviet police 
searched homes, arrested activists, and interrogated its founders with the intention of eradicating 
the group before it gained mass appeal. To add to the internal tension, a bomb exploded on 
January 8 in the Moscow subway system, maiming and killing passengers. Soviet journalists 




 In an attempt to save his fellow dissidents from further persecution, Sakharov reached out 
to the West for assistance as he believed Carter’s commitment to human rights was “serious and 
sincere.”126 “It’s very important to defend those who suffer because of their unviolent struggle 
for openness, for justice, for destroyed rights of the other people. Our and your duty,” he wrote, 
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“are to fight for them.” Sakharov summarized the conditions that dissident groups worked under, 
citing police brutality, murder, and persecution.
127
 He ended with a list of sixteen political 
prisoners whom he felt needed aid through the efforts of the administration.
128
 From his 
apartment in Moscow, he handed over the letter to Martin Garbus, an American lawyer, for 




 Garbus promptly gave the American media Sakharov’s letter. Newspapers latched onto 
the event, printing Sakharov’s letter and calling for Carter to respond and fulfill his campaign 
promises. When the administration did not immediately answer Sakharov’s letter, newspapers 
questioned Carter’s commitment to the cause of human rights.130 Many articles began to include 
an ominous telegram written by Soviet dissidents that had followed Sakharov’s letter. This 
telegram, pleading with the administration to protect the beloved scientist from arrest and 
punishment, informed Carter that “Sakharov [was] in…mortal danger” and asked Carter “to use 
[his] authority to defend” him.131 Sakharov and his fellow dissidents fully expected Carter to 
openly and positively respond to these messages and ensure their protection to the best of the 
American government’s ability. To the American public, this exchange was the first test of the 
administration’s idealist ambitions. Hope and expectations ran high. 
 Brzezinski considered the media sensationalism to amount to no more than “public 
flap.”132 Sakharov’s letter had been an unexpected obstacle and cut short any honeymoon period 
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the American government could have used to its diplomatic advantage. How the Carter 
responded to Sakharov would affect relations with the Soviets for the next four years and had the 
potential to significantly damage SALT II negotiations. To add to the dilemma, Brzezinski 
informed the President that his response would have to be open so as to reaffirm the 
administration’s human rights commitment to the American public.133  
 The National Security Adviser began to demonstrate doubts concerning his initial policy 
to use human rights as a weapon against the USSR. The need to both respond to Sakharov and 
reach out to Brezhnev called for an adjustment in how the administration interacted with 
dissidents. Discarding some of the idealism from the administration’s early ambitions, 
Brzezinski suggested that a reply to Sakharov “expressing…general sentiments on the issue” 
would be “less inflammatory” to Soviet leaders.134 Unlike Sakharov’s letter, Carter’s tone needed 
to be impersonal and the letter’s content needed to exclude specifics. This decision to construct a 
lukewarm letter demonstrated that Brzezinski believed establishing relations with Brezhnev took 
precedent to the dissident cause. 
 While the Department of State accepted Brzezinski’s framework and began writing a 
response to Sakharov, the National Security Adviser constructed a letter to Brezhnev with the 
assistance of Vance. Brzezinski “tightened” sections of the original letter that the Department of 
State had penned, believing the letter to sound “too gushy and naïve.”135 As a draft of the letter 
graced the President’s desk for his approval, the adviser included a memo specifying what 
further revisions he believed necessary. Carter read Brzezinski’s memo and subsequently 
“assimilated” its suggestions into the final letter, making the message to Brezhnev friendly, yet 
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 The letter openly confirmed Carter’s ultimate goal of nonproliferation 
as it called for a SALT II agreement “without delay” with the intention that other weapons-
reducing agreements would follow. The administration avoided specifically referencing its 
human rights campaign, only stating that both countries could not “be indifferent to the fate of 
freedom and individual human rights.”137 The letter both intentionally deemphasized the Carter 




 Meanwhile, the American public awaited the Carter administration’s response to 
Sakharov. On February 5, the long anticipated letter was made public. Its content conformed to 
the National Security Adviser’s guidance as it was short, impersonable, and lacked the usual zeal 
of the Georgian crusader. It simply assured Sakharov that the American government would 
continue its “firm commitment to promote the respect for human rights not only in [the United 
States] but also abroad” and vaguely promised to seek the protection of dissidents in every 
nation.
139
 The letter conformed to Brzezinski’s decision to give precedent to relations with 
Brezhnev over correspondence with Sakharov. Specifically, the letter did not mention the 
USSR’s human rights abuses but instead expanded the protection of freedom to a global scale in 
an effort to preemptively appease the Soviet government. The letter fulfilled its minimal 
requirement of refusing the media any opportunity to “draw analogies with Ford and 
Solzhenitsyn,” but then ventured no further.140 Brzezinski believed that he accomplished both 
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establishing stable relations with the Soviets while successfully reassuring the American people 
of the administration’s authenticity.  
 He judged incorrectly. The White House received a “brutal, cynical, sneering, and even 
patronizing” letter from Brezhnev on February 25.141 The Soviet leader did not interpret Carter’s 
response to Sakharov as the politically necessary acknowledgement that Brzezinski had intended. 
Instead, Brezhnev considered the letter to be a component of the “so called question of ‘human 
rights’” that the administration was using to pressure the Soviet government. Carter’s response to 
Sakharov- although mild in Brzezinski’s opinion - was a direct and aggressive “interference” 
into internal Soviet affairs.
142
 Indeed, the government in Moscow had interpreted the 
correspondence from the President as an American “guarantee” of Sakharov’s “personal 
immunity” and became furious that they were unable to manage Sakharov as they saw fit.143 
 The General Secretary ended his message with a warning that the administration’s actions 
were “not the way to deal with the Soviet Union” and reminded Carter that the stability of 
American-Soviet relations were at stake. He expressed a coolness towards Carter’s SALT II and 
nonproliferation goals, perceiving no significant changes from previous administrations. Carter’s 
“statements of a general nature” correlated with the Soviet government’s ambitions, but 
Brezhnev offered no words of encouragement or particular enthusiasm.
144
 The letter’s “chilling 
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 The nature of Brezhnev’s letter astonished Brzezinski. The National Security Adviser 
believed that Carter’s letter to Sakharov should have assured Brezhnev that Carter’s “concern 
was global in character.” Brzezinski also had expected the Soviet leader to understand the Carter 
administration’s need to respond to the physicist in order to satisfy the domestic demand. The 
Soviet leader, he claimed, should have “simply ignored, or at least played down, the matter” so 
as to not interfere with Carter’s genuine attempt to establish a personal relationship. Brzezinski 
incorrectly assumed that the Soviet government considered a secure partnership with the United 
States more advantageous than rebuffing American humanitarian policy.
146
  
 Brzezinski’s miscalculation had dire consequences as the incident cast a dark cloud over 
the next four years. To the Soviets, the letter to Sakharov proved that Carter was a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing, a man bent on dominating Moscow through a rhetoric of human rights, It 
destroyed the opportunity for the world leaders to develop the level of familiarity that Brzezinski 
had hoped to accomplish. As a result, SALT II’s negotiations would begin the following month 
in a tense and distrusting atmosphere. Brezhnev would never forgive the American government 
for involving itself in domestic Soviet affairs. 
 Moreover, Brzezinski’s actions also failed to substantively aid the dissident cause. 
Following the correspondence between Carter and Sakharov, Moscow noted a sharp increase in 
the number of American politicians and activists entering the Soviet Union and feared that these 
visitors were interacting with dissidents. Believing the influx of Americans with “pertinent 
instructions” to be connected to Sakharov’s letter, Soviet police arrested the physicist in 
March.
147
 Although further American intervention protected Sakharov from long term 
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imprisonment, Carter’s correspondence had directly caused the Soviet government to increase its 
harassment of the activist. 
 Sakharov also questioned the administration’s success regarding the protection of 
dissidents. Ten years after his arrest, Sakharov reflected on his correspondence with Carter and 
expressed his disappointment. Too often, he wrote, Western statesmen behaved as though they 
existed “in isolation,” and did not consider the direct consequences that their actions had on the 
Soviet population. American politicians needed to have a genuine desire to assist the oppressed 
instead of “picking each other to pieces” for domestic political gain. Sakharov believed Carter 
was sincere, but that he failed to rise above mainstream American politics in order to expand 
human rights. Most of Sakharov’s criticism regarded the general breakdown of the 
administration’s humanitarian policies that would occur as the administration continued, but the 
scientist also speculated that Carter’s public response to his letter led to the arrests of two of his 
close associates, Yuri Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg.
148
 
 Even Brzezinski concluded that the letter to the Soviet activist had failed. Along with 
Sakharov, he too believed that the letter directly caused the Soviets to increase “their suppression 
of human-rights activists” in subsequent months.149 The letter itself only worsened the conditions 
of dissidents and raised the Soviet government’s suspicions of human rights activists and 
American interference. Indeed, the American government had put the Soviet Union on the 
ideological defensive just as Brzezinski had wanted and Moscow responded by demonstrating 
that it did not care about being put on the defensive. 
 The letter did meagerly succeed to reassure the American public of Carter’s humanitarian 
intentions. However, it accomplished this at the irreversible cost of damaging relations with the 
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Soviet Union. Letters between Carter and Brezhnev continued for the rest of the administration, 
but they failed create the personal atmosphere between the leaders that Brzezinski had wanted. 
Carter’s sincere aspirations to expand human rights confused and angered Brezhnev, who did not 
understand why the American President insisted on involving himself in Soviet internal affairs. 
When SALT II negotiations reopened in March 1977 – only two months after Carter took office - 
the American-Soviet relationship was already strained. It would take two years for the 
superpowers to negotiate the content of SALT II instead of the one year the Carter administration 
had aimed for. Brzezinski’s failures were responsible for much of this tension. In his bid to both 
satisfy the Soviet dissident movement and establish stable relations with Brezhnev, Brzezinski 
failed succeed in either attempt. 
* 
 Brzezinski greatly influenced SALT II. Although he was not directly involved with 
negotiations, he greatly influenced the proposals Vance presented to the Soviets. He headed the 
Special Coordination Committee, the White House group responsible for SALT II negotiations 
and retained an unusually tight grip its activities. For instance, Brzezinski insisted retaining the 
proposals and negotiation instructions from the Department of State until the instant Vance was 
ready to leave for Moscow.
150
 Brzezinski very much controlled the environment in which the 
negotiations were shaped. The National Security Adviser’s close relationship with Carter also 
helped him influence SALT II. Brzezinski had much greater access to Carter than any other 
adviser, sending him Weekly National Security Reports and meeting with him several times a 
day. Through Carter, Brzezinski was able to interject his voice at paramount moments, 
effectively influencing the most significant treaty of the administration. 
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 SALT II negotiations had begun during the Nixon administration and had dragged on 
through the 1970s. While the focus of the 1972 SALT I treaty had been the limitation of 
conventional weapons, SALT II sought the reduction of nuclear weapons. In 1974, Ford and 
Brezhnev met at Vladivostok and agreed that their countries would maintain an equal number of 
weapons. This unofficial agreement claimed that both countries would hold no more than 2400 
intercontinental launchers by 1985. The Vladivostok Summit left out critical SALT II topics, 
including limitations on the Soviet Backfire bomber and the newly developed American cruise 
missiles. The Soviet government was insistent that SALT II follow the 2400 limit created at the 
Vladivostok Summit. To the American people and Carter administration, the validity of this 
agreement was questionable as neither party had signed a treaty. 
 The Carter administration used the Vladivostok agreement as a starting point. However, 
true to Carter’s wish for deep cuts, the committee constructed their proposals around the desire to 
decrease the 2400 limitation on ICBMs. Under Brzezinski, the SCC constructed three proposals: 
1) delay SALT II so that details regarding the Backfire bomber and US cruise missiles could be 
specifically negotiated, with an agreement to uphold the 2400 ICMB limit, 2) a 150 limit on 
heavy ICMBs which would include the Backfire bomber, a 2500-kilometer limit on all cruise 
missiles, and a reduction of ICMB to 1800, or 3) a split between the first two proposals.
151
 
 Brzezinski supported the second of these options, believing that the first would 
unnecessarily delay an agreement and that the third did not demand enough limitations on the 
Soviets. The National Security adviser was concerned that the 2500-kilometer limit on cruise 
missiles, which favored the United States, would be too heavy a concession for the Soviets.
152
 
During the last SCC meeting before Vance’s trip to Moscow, the SCC agreed that the Secretary 
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of State would show the Soviets only the first two proposals. By concealing the third option, they 
hoped to pressure the Soviet government into choosing an option more appealing to the 
administration. Brzezinski anticipated the difficulty in the plan and “foresaw” its failure. In his 
journal he described his concern that the United States would have to agree to the third proposal, 
which would progress US-USSR relations but not significantly give America any advantages. 
However, “if we can stand fast and not be intimidated and keep pressing, it is conceivable that 
the Soviets will…accept our first proposal,” he wrote on March 25.153 Brzezinski’s strategy was 
one of aggression. Although he had doubts that the Soviets would initially accept the terms from 
either the first or second proposal, he believed that Vance needed to push these agreements. The 
Polish-born adviser believed that the Soviets could be pressured into concessions if the 
Americans were willing to assert themselves. 
 Just as Brzezinski predicted, the proposals were rejected as “cheap and shady” by the 
Soviets.
154
 Their loudest complaint was that both proposals deviated too far from the Ford-
Brezhnev agreement and believed that Carter could not be serious about the options Vance had 
put before them.
155
 Much to Brzezinski’s frustration, the Secretary of State was unwilling to 
defend either proposal when they came under Soviet scrutiny. On March 30 after the Soviets had 
rejected both proposals, Vance cabled the White House, requesting permission to offer the third 
proposal. Brzezinski refuted this request, calling Vance’s suggestion “weak-kneed” and advising 
President Carter to not allow Vance to reveal the third proposal.
156
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 The blunt rejection from the Soviets surprised the President, who had believed that the 
Soviets would “meet us halfway and negotiate in good faith.”157 Carter agreed with Brzezinski’s 
suggestion and cabled to Vance that he was to push forward with only the first two proposals.
158
 
In the following weeks of the negotiations, Brzezinski would continue to hold fast and refuse to 
consider offering the last proposition to the Soviets. Most members of the SCC felt pessimistic 
and even President Carter submitted that they were “a long way from a comprehensive 
agreement.”159 Despite waves of criticism from the American media and the general defeatist 
attitude of the SCC, Brzezinski refused to label the first round of negotiations a “breakdown” of 
relations. He continued to assert a headstrong policy, believing that the Americans could obtain 
agreeable terms if they did back down from their position. While most members of the 
committee began to reconstruct proposals in the hopes of gaining Soviet approval, the National 
Security Adviser believed that they had offered enough options to Moscow and that “the ball was 
in the Soviet court.”160 
 As the SCC regrouped and SALT II negotiations continued through 1977 and 1978, 
Brzezinski focused his attention to another matter. In July 1978, he saw the opportunity to 
pressure the Soviets politically and ideologically. The FBI had apprehended two Soviet spies 
operating as UN employees in May and, much to the embarrassment and anger of Moscow, the 
US courts sentenced both spies to fifty years in prison.
161
 Brzezinski saw their sentencing as an 
opportunity to bargain the release of Soviet dissidents.  
 Brzezinski believed that this exchange would be mutually beneficial to the United States 
and the Soviet Union. As the Soviet government was so furious at the sentencing of their spies, 
                                                          
157
 Carter, White House Diary, 35. 
158
 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 162. 
159
 FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 19. 
160
 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 164-165. 
161
 “2 Soviets Convicted on Espionage Charges.” Chicago Tribune, October 14, 1978, 2-s1. 
52 
 
the National Security Adviser was certain that they would agree to an exchange of prisoners and 
that he had the advantage. He also had high expectations for the exchange. When presenting the 
idea to Carter, he claimed that it would “contribute to a better atmosphere” between the two 
nations and would “make SALT II ratification easier.” Furthermore, when the adviser had 
secured an agreement with Dobrynin, he planned to uphold the success in front of the American 
public as proof that the human rights campaign was alive and well.
162
. He was confident that this 
exchange could not fail. The President signed off on Brzezinski’s idea immediately. 
 The American side was entirely the handiwork of the National Security Adviser. Unlike 
the Sakharov letter, this exchange was hidden from the public and would only be revealed when 
the Brzezinski had achieved success. The negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy 
Dobrynin were unconventionally conducted in Brzezinski’s office and home as well as in 
Dobrynin’s apartment over the next year. This privacy allowed Brzezinski the flexibility to alter 




 Without the formality of traditional negotiations or the presence of anyone else besides 
Dobrynin, Brzezinski did not restrain himself. His negotiation methods were harsh. At times, the 
talks devolved into “heated” arguments, especially when Brzezinski insisted that the Soviet 
government refrain from executing prisoners that the American government wanted to protect.
164
 
He pushed through Dobrynin’s cries that Brzezinski’s demands interfered with internal Soviet 
affairs. More than once, Brzezinski “laughed in the Ambassador’s face, telling him…that the 
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former Soviet UN employees would continue to enjoy American hospitality for the next half 
century” and threatening to shut down negotiations altogether.165 
 The National Security Adviser used the conditions of the negotiations to his benefit. He 
was confident that Dobrynin would concede to his demands because the Soviet government so 
anxiously wanted the release of their spies. Through the talks, Brzezinski focused exclusively on 
using the Soviet prisoners as a bargaining chip and held high his demands. Without the constant 
watch of the public, Brzezinski was also able to construct and reconstruct his demands as the 
months progressed. Initially, he had compiled a list of dissidents who he considered “suitable 
objects of an exchange” and presented it to Dobrynin. Brzezinski’s intention was to see how 
many concessions he could squeeze out of the Soviets and - with the exception of a couple of 
well-known activists - Brzezinski was not overly picky which dissidents the USSR agreed to 
release. His original list attested to his focus on numbers rather than particular persons or groups 
as it included nationalists, religious dissidents, and human rights activists.
166
 
 One of the few individuals Brzezinski particularly hoped to protect was Aleksandr 
Ginzburg. Ginzburg was one of Sakharov’s close associates who the Soviets had arrested after 
the Carter-Sakharov exchange.
167
 A poet, human rights activist, and member of the Moscow 
Helsinki Watch Group, Ginzburg was well known in the United States for his charity work. The 
author operated a network of resources that aided dissidents and their families. His arrest and 
imprisonment were published throughout American newspapers and – much like Sakharov – the 
public grew captivated by his story and expected the Carter administration to act. To Americans, 
Ginzburg’s imprisonment was a testament of the Soviet government’s immorality. It was not 
interpreted as “the usual act of violence against a single dissident,” but rather the USSR’s 
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attempt “to crush by hunger and poverty thousands of families…and to force thousands of others 
into fear and silence.”168  Brzezinski had appealed for Ginzburg from the beginning of 
negotiations with Ambassador Dobrynin, knowing that his safety would reinvigorate public 
support for Carter’s human rights crusade. 
 After months of “quibbling over numbers and people,” Brzezinski succeeded in obtaining 
an agreement that included the release of Ginzburg. Along with the poet would be four other 
dissidents: Gyorgi Vins, a Baptist and activist; Valentyn Moroz, an Ukranian nationalist, and 
Edward Kuznetsov and Mark Dymshits, two Jewish dissidents. The National Security Adviser 
was satisfied with the release of Ginzburg as well as the number of other dissidents he was able 
to obtain. Furthermore, by securing a variety of activists the administration’s message of hope 




 On April 27, two of Brzezinski’s staff traveled to New York in order to welcome the five 
prisoners to the United States. They found all five “cramped in a small cabin, each seated next to 
several KGB guards, and unsure of what exactly was taking place.
170
 Once their arrival became 
known, it did not take long for the Western world to explode in celebration. Thousands gathered 
in New York City to honor and welcome the dissidents.
171
 In a highly publicized event, President 
Carter and Vins attended Sunday service side-by-side and prayed together.
172
 To Carter, the 
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exchange was one of the most “significant things in a human way that we’ve done since I’ve 
been in office.”173 
 The moment was both a joyous occasion for the nation as well as the capstone of 
Brzezinski’s career as National Security Adviser. The day after the dissidents arrived, he 
received a touching call from Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin who expressed his 
gratitude regarding the rescue of the Jewish dissidents. Brzezinski recorded the conversation in 
his journal that evening, recalling that Begin “thanked me from the bottom of his heart and told 
me that I have earned a mitzvah. Mitzvah apparently is a Hebrew concept of a blessed deed for 
which one is grateful.” In his memoirs he expressed a similar attitude to Carter’s as he called the 
prisoner exchange “one of the most gratifying experiences of my four years in the White 
House.”174 
 Brzezinski had reason to celebrate. The prisoner exchange was a success as it “reflected 
Carter’s commitment to human rights” and demonstrated to the American public that the 
President had not given up on his humanitarian crusade.
175
 Ginzburg, beloved by the American 
public and imprisoned by of Carter’s letter to Sakharov, was freed. For Brzezinski personally, it 
was also testament to his negotiation method. The American government obtained an 
advantageous agreement because of Brzezinski’s assertive nature and his refusal to submit to 
terms that he did not believe would benefit the United States. From where he stood on April 27, 
1979, as the press bombarded the administration with questions, the public cheered Carter’s 
efforts, and the former-Soviet dissidents walked freely on American soil, it was clear that his 
unyielding character had been the key to conquering the totalitarian giant.  
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 Brzezinski’s success was also due in part to the status of the US-USSR relationship in 
early 1979. SALT II was in its final stages and both countries wished to enter the last phrase of 
talks on a favorable note, with such sensitive issues resolved. Ever the opportunist, Brzezinski 
continued to influence the SALT II negotiations through the SCC and his relationship to Carter. 
He asserted his advice to Carter, many times drowning out the ideas of others. The opportunities 
for Brzezinski to influence SALT II were often unpremeditated, with the National Security 
Adviser happening to be with Carter when the President needed to make a decision.   
 Brzezinski recalled such a particular event in his memoirs. In December of 1978, Vance 
was in Geneva and negotiating the final details of SALT II. Encryption was the last issue for the 
superpowers to resolve. Vance believed that the United States needed to submit to the Soviet 
proposals regarding the disagreement or else risk SALT II altogether. Arguing with Vance on the 
phone, Brzezinski was adamant that the US “not accept the vague formulations that the Soviets 
were proposing” and that the Secretary of State refuse to submit.176 After arguing for some time, 
Vance demanded Brzezinski review the situation with Carter and call him back. 
 The President, who was struck with an illness at the time, was awoken at 10:30 p.m. 
Brzezinski gave him an assessment of the problem and advised Carter to not give into the 
Soviet’s proposal. Brzezinski believed that a compromise “might get us SALT but it would not 
be in the US interests.” Carter agreed with the National Security Adviser and informed him to 
cable Vance instructions to refuse the compromise. While it would be incorrect to conclude that 
the President agreed with Brzezinski because the National Security Adviser manipulated him, it 
is likely that Brzezinski’s argument was greatly helped by the fact that Vance was not included 
in the discussion and that such a close relationship had formed between Brzezinski and Carter.  
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 As Brzezinski responded to Vance, he “felt sorry” for denying the Secretary of State a 
quick victory, but believed that the United States would obtain an agreeable treaty only if its 
negotiators stood firm. Brzezinski was correct to deny the Soviets a compromise. Indeed, the 
following year the Soviets accepted the American proposal on encryption as well as most of the 
United States’ first proposals from March 1977.177 While the episode only lasts a couple of pages 
in the National Security Adviser’s memoirs, it demonstrated the effectiveness of Brzezinski’s 
negotiation tactics. 
* 
 Certainly, Brzezinski’s refusal to agree to Soviet term helped the United States obtain an 
advantageous SALT II agreement and a favorable prisoner exchange. Brzezinski’s 
uncompromising methods did not produce quick agreements, but in these cases the results were 
benefited the United States. In the final SALT II negotiations, the Soviets agreed to a 
quantitative parity which included both nations dismantling some of their nuclear weapons.
178
 
This reduction of weaponry was a step towards Carter’s broad nonproliferation strategy and 
would not have occurred if Brzezinski hadn’t stepped into the proposal process during 
paramount moments. The prisoner exchange was also a success because of Brzezinski’s strategy. 
He asserted his demands and, while retaining a level of flexibility, expected the Soviets to fulfill 
his demands. With both SALT II and the exchange, Brzezinski maintained that if the Soviets 
would not agree to his terms, then there would be no agreement at all. 
 The National Security Adviser’s attitude demonstrated how he believed the American 
government needed to operate during this period of the Cold War. Believing that détente favored 
the Soviets and would eventually end, Brzezinski wanted the United States to take advantage of 
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the easing of tensions. The best course for this was to only agree to international treaties that 
benefitted America and demonstrate to the world that the United States was the moral 
superpower. This course of action would ensure long term gains for the United States. With such 
confidence that détente would surely end because of the reemergence of ideological conflict, 
Brzezinski had no qualms about angering Soviet leaders or not obtaining SALT II. 
 However, Brzezinski’s strategy had its flaws. The exchange of letters between Carter and 
Sakharov had cost the administration a constructive relationship between Carter and Brezhnev. 
While Brzezinski considered the letter to Sakharov mild, the fact that the administration sent it at 
all was too assertive for the Soviets. The results of the correspondences illustrated the deeper 
issue with the National Security Adviser’s thinking. The Soviets were not willing to submit or 
ignore American interference into their affairs. While Brzezinski calculated that the Soviets 
would ignore the Sakharov letter, their confidence matched that of the adviser as they had no 
reason to submit to American wishes and responded accordingly. The flaw in Brzezinski’s 
strategy was that it only worked the United States already had an advantage.  
 To the adviser, this flaw was not an overwhelming concern as he believed the Soviet 
system was bound to eventually crumble, but it had consequences for others involved in the US-
USSR rivalry. Soviet dissidents particularly suffered from Brzezinski’s strategy. After the 
Sakharov exchange, the Soviet government increased persecution of activists because of Carter’s 
letter. Even the prisoner exchange – the highlight of Brzezinski’s career – hurt dissident activity 
in the USSR. Ginzburg, Vins, and Moroz had led underground activities invaluable to the 
dissident movement, but with their removal from the USSR they were unable to help their fellow 
Soviet citizens. While Americans hailed the recovery of Ginzburg just as Brzezinski had 
planned, the man’s removal from the Soviet Union meant that he was unable to aid the thousands 
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of people he reached before his arrest. He expressed his frustration with this fact. Upon being 
asked by a reporter how he felt about his transfer to America, he grunted, “Would you like it if 
you were exiled from your own country, not having been asked?”179 Vins also admitted feeling 
guilty for his removal from his congregation and fellow activists, much to Carter’s concern.180  
 It is doubtful that Brzezinski particularly cared that his actions stifled dissident activity. 
From his earliest works he described dissidents as dreamers and idealists who at best could 
preserve “human beings for a better day.”181 As they did not easily fit into his analysis of the 
Soviet system, Brzezinski decided to use them as a political tool to ideologically undermine the 
Soviet Union. While Carter’s human rights crusade against the USSR had its shortcomings and 
failed to help the broader activities of the dissidents, Brzezinski was able to uphold the successes 
of the campaign to the public and declare the United States the morally superior superpower. 
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By analyzing Brzezinski’s early publications and term as National Security Adviser, it 
becomes clear that Brzezinski’s ideas built upon one another. His works before the Carter 
administration explained his interpretation of the past and his vision for the future. This vision 
included a globalized world under the leadership of the United States. The USSR, with its 
outdated political system, would crumble and submit to American power. Brzezinski’s activities 
during the Carter administration demonstrated how he believed the American government 
needed to act in order to fulfill this vision. In particular, the United States needed to assert its 
policies and hold firm against the totalitarian giant. Much of Brzezinski’s confidence during the 
Carter administration came from his analyses. As the Soviet Union was inherently flawed and on 
an evitable path of collapse, Brzezinski had the freedom to refuse agreements that he did not 
think benefited America. Together, these periods of Brzezinski’s life illustrate his complete 
vision of how the United States would become world leader. 
Most of Brzezinski’s ideas were successful. In 1991, when the USSR dissolved it seemed 
to be proof that his analyses were correct. Despite the flaws of his theories of totalitarianism and 
peaceful engagement, his prediction that revisionism would undermine the Soviet system to the 
point of collapse was true. His term as National Security Adviser also had substantial successes. 
Although the administration was plagued with problems, the release of Soviet dissidents and 
details of SALT II favorable to the US were the handiwork of Brzezinski.  
Today, Brzezinski continues to build on his original ideas. When Russia invaded Crimea 
in February 2014, the American media rushed to hear Brzezinski’s diagnosis. He immediately 
and fervently criticized the Russian government for its imperialist actions, drawing analogies to 
the USSR’s actions during the 1950s. Traces of his early works can be heard through his current 
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speeches. He continues to refer to Russia as an ideological society - this time built on a 
nationalist philosophy – and labels its political and intellectual systems irrelevant on the global 
stage. This current analysis of Russia raises several questions. When Brzezinski examined the 
Soviet system he claimed that its irrelevancy was one of the reasons the USSR would collapse. 
Supposing that Russia is “irrelevant” in the same way, Brzezinski has yet to offer a specific view 
of what Russia will look like when it succumbs to the same fate. 
But whatever future ideas Brzezinski offers the world, they are sure to be bold and he is 
sure to fight for them. He has no plans of retiring from his academic or political careers anytime 
soon. Brzezinski has shown himself to be an intellectual force to be reckon with over his sixty 
year career. When facing the chaos of international politics, the Polish-born intellect grabs hold 
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